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Abstract 
 
By focusing on the near-term campaign in the 2014 European elections analysts have tended 
to over-look a series of longer-term trends that were jointly and inexorably leading to the 
Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) process and to some at least of the subsequent structural 
reforms to the Commission. The paper argues that those longer-term trends continue and that 
the (s)election of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission and the 
structural reforms he subsequently introduced are better understood as steps in ongoing 
processes rather than fresh departures. Thus, what will happen in 2019 will have been 
conditioned not only by 2014, but also by previous elections and previous developments, as 
considered in this paper.  
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Chronicle of an Election Foretold:  
The Longer-Term Trends leading to the 
‘Spitzenkandidaten’ procedure and the 
Election of Jean-Claude Juncker as European 
Commission President  
 
 
The basic question this paper will address is the following: ‘How and why did 
Jean-Claude Juncker become Commission President in 2014?’ This paper, I 
should stress from the outset, is not about the personality or the politician. In 
an illustrious and accomplished domestic and international political career 
spanning some forty years, Jean-Claude Juncker was previously Prime 
Minister of his country for eighteen years, Finance Minister for twenty years 
(ten of those overlapping) and President of the Eurogroup for nine years. Nor 
should it be forgotten that in October/November 2009 Jean-Claude Juncker 
was already being seriously considered as a candidate for the position of 
President of the European Council. Despite the media coverage to the 
contrary at times, Jean-Claude Juncker was never anything less than a very 
strong candidate for the position. The question this paper addresses is not 
about Juncker’s alleged merits or de-merits. Rather, this paper will point to 
the confluence of a series of longer-term trends, some more visible than 
others, but all of them leading inexorably, sooner or later, to the situation now 
reached with the Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker.  
 
This paper is not, therefore about the fine grain detail of the months leading 
up to the May 2014 European elections – the tweets and the televised debates 
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and so on. Above all, it is not an analysis of the whole so-called 
Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidate) procedure. (For those interested in such 
analyses, see Sara B. Hobolt, 2014; Thomas Christiansen, 2015, and Julian 
Priestley and Nereo Penalver Garcia, 2015.) This paper will not concentrate on 
the political manoeuvring and the deal-making in the European Council, the 
European Parliament and in the national capitals, fascinating though it was. 
Rather, I would like to explain how this President of the Commission ended 
up as this President of the Commission, and I hope what follows will clear up 
the doubts of those who find such a phrase perplexingly tautological.  
 
In particular, this paper will seek to show how the sudden concentration of 
the media on the shorter-term events of the European election campaign 
distracted from certain longer-term trends, and how concentration on the 
short-term tactics of the protagonists distracted from longer-term strategy. 
Using the metaphor of a microscope, I would like to switch to a lower power 
of magnification, so that nine longer-term trends or phenomena will become 
more discernible, namely: 
 
- An increasingly crowded institutional landscape; 
- The pendulum from visionary charismatics to quiet consolidators (as 
Presidents of the European Commission); 
- The growing size of, and numbers in, the European Commission; 
- The growing role of the European Council; 
- The growing empowerment of the Commission Presidency; 
- The evolution of appointment mechanisms for the Presidency of the 
Commission; 
- The growing powers and role of the European Parliament; 
- Increasing German concerns about the democratic nature of the 
European Union; 
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- The European People’s Party’s constitutional and federal vision and, in 
that context, the concept of lead candidates (‘Spitzenkandidaten’). 
 
The paper will conclude that the current President of the European 
Commission, who happens to be Jean-Claude Juncker, lies at the confluence 
of all of these trends and transitions and, indeed, the appointment of Jean-
Claude Juncker, or somebody very like him, was largely a product of them. 
As the paper will show, the Lisbon Treaty did not quite envisage what 
actually occurred, but it got what it got because the underlying trends were 
inexorable, if not irresistible. 
 
 
1. An increasingly crowded institutional landscape 
 
As the European integration process has progressed, so the European 
Commission has found itself functioning in an increasingly crowded 
institutional landscape, with a subsequent diminution of its separate visibility 
and a blurring of its responsibilities. Apart from the European Council and 
the European Parliament (dealt with separately below), institutional 
newcomers have included: the Court of Auditors; the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development; the institutional arrangements under the 
Schengen Agreement; the Committee of the Regions; the European Central 
Bank; the Eurozone and its mechanisms; and the European External Action 
Service. These developments have not always by any means led to an 
encroachment on the European Commission’s role and powers, and 
sometimes the effect has been the opposite (on economic governance, for 
example), but they have nevertheless increasingly seemed to hem it in. Other 
developments, often the price paid to keep the integration momentum 
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progressing, have included the ‘pillars’ structure of the Maastricht Treaty1 
and the Open Method of Coordination. In this Brobdingnagian vision of 
Europe, the landscape is more clouded, roles are less clear, purity has given 
way to profusion, and nowhere is this more apparent than in terms of public 
perceptions. When Jacques Delors first became President of the European 
Commission in 1984, many of these actors or processes did not exist; indeed, 
an irony of his three presidential mandates is that he was responsible for the 
future existence of many of them. Moreover, part of Delors’ genius was to 
seek a sort of constructive complicity with the Commission’s chief 
protagonists – the European Council and the European Parliament. The 
relationships with both will be dealt with in more detail below, but the basic 
equation was the European Commission’s support for the development of the 
roles of the European Council and the European Parliament in return for the 
support of both for the Commission’s integrationist policy agenda. As such, 
the institutional relationship was a transitional one. Both the European 
Parliament and the European Council have since become fully-formed and 
fully-grown institutions in their own right. It would nevertheless be 
understandable if the European Commission were to seek a reassertion of its 
authority, albeit in a more restrained context, based on clearer lines of 
command and of legitimacy, but how might that be done?  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         1 Of course, the pillar structure was necessary to keep a unified structure for European integration within a single treaty.  There would otherwise have been separate treaties (especially on foreign policy), even possibly with separate institutions. In the overall scheme of things, therefore, the pillar structure was a positive for the Commission. I am grateful to David Galloway for making this point.  
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2. The pendulum from visionary charismatics to quiet 
consolidators 
 
Taking a historical view of the Presidency of the European Commission and 
its predecessor, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the period from 1952 until the present day can be sub-divided 
into two parts. In the first, from 1952 through until about 1994, the pendulum 
traditionally swung from ambitious, combative and fervent visionaries – 
whose chief distinguishing feature was that they had never been Prime 
Minister or President – to low-profile, competent, technocratic consolidators. 
To characterise individuals such as René Mayer or Jean Rey in such a way is 
not necessarily to pass judgement on the personalities themselves, nor on 
their political achievements in their domestic contexts. To paraphrase Ortega 
y Gassett, as High Authority/Commission Presidents they were themselves 
plus their circumstances. That said, it would be commonly agreed that there 
were four such visionary High Authority/Commission Presidents in that first 
period, namely: Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein, Roy Jenkins, and Jacques 
Delors2.  
 
Jean Monnet, FR, 1952-55 
René Mayer, FR, 1955-58 
Paul Finet, BE, 1958-59 
Piero Malvestiti, IT, 1959-63 
Rinaldo Del Bo, IT, 1963-67 
Albert Coppé, BE, 1967 
                                                         2 Thus, I do not include among the visionaries Sicco Mansholt and his unexpected and eventful one-year (1972-1973) interregnum, though he certainly made waves! See van Merriënboer (2015) for an amusing account. It should also be pointed out that Monnet, Hallstein and Delors were also experienced technocrats, but that was not the main impression they left. 
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Walter Hallstein, DE, 1958-67 
Jean Rey, BE, 1967-70 
Franco Maria Malfatti, IT, 1970-72 
Sicco Mansholt, NL, 1972-73 
François Xavier Ortoli, FR, 1973-77 
 
Roy Jenkins, UK, 1977-81 
Gaston Thorn, LU, 1981-85 – former Prime Minister 
 
Jacques Delors, FR, 1985-1995 
 Jacques Santer, LU, 1995-99 – former Prime Minister 
 Romano Prodi, IT, 1999-2004 – former Prime Minister 
 José Manuel Barroso, PT, 2004-2014 – former Prime Minister 
 
Jean-Claude Juncker, LU, 2014 – former Prime Minister 
 
The European Coal and Steel Community’s High Authority was the 
embodiment of Jean Monnet’s supranational vision. As its first President 
(1952-54), he immediately insisted on the introduction of the twin principles 
of collegiality and confidentiality into its rules of procedure (those principles 
remain enshrined in the European Commission’s rules of procedure to this 
day), thus ensuring that its individual members would be shielded from 
‘national instructions’. He resigned in 1954 and was succeeded ‘by a series of 
largely unknown technocrats.’ Teasdale and Bainbridge (2012), p. 297.  
 
Though (unlike Monnet with regard to the ECSC) not the chief blueprint 
draftsman, Walter Hallstein had been actively involved in the negotiations 
that led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome and hence the creation of the 
EEC. As the European Commission’s first President (1958-1967), Hallstein 
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jealously guarded the supranational flame and rapidly built on a vision that 
led to the creation of a customs union and a common market and a common 
agricultural policy and, later, the Merger Treaty, own resources and qualified 
majority voting. Hallstein’s vision included a strong Parliament and an 
embryonic foreign policy. So much, so fast, led to several ugly clashes with 
President de Gaulle, culminating in the so-called ‘empty chair crisis’ (de 
Gaulle was to Hallstein as Thatcher was to Delors – and vice versa!). Hallstein 
was badly bruised by the 1966 crisis and resigned in 1967, but by then his 
monument, to paraphrase Sir Christopher Wren’s memorial in St Paul’s 
cathedral, could be seen all around him. He was followed, to quote Teasdale 
and Bainbridge again, ‘by a series of short-lived incumbents … who were 
more modest in their political style and more careful in their handling of 
heads of state or government.’ Teasdale and Bainbridge (2012), p. 506.  
 
Roy Jenkins came to the Presidency of the European Commission (1977-1981) 
having effectively headed the cross-party campaign for a ‘yes’ vote in the June 
1975 referendum on continued UK membership of the EEC. Though not a 
fervent visionary in the Hallstein mould, Jenkins was a convinced European 
and his Commission was marked by a series of important steps in reasserting 
the Commission’s role (for example ensuring, despite French President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing’s opposition, that he and his successors could attend G7 
summits) and in pushing the integrationist logic further (most notably by 
resuscitating the concept of Economic and Monetary Union after the failure of 
the Werner Plan and the ‘snake’ in the earlier 1970s).  
 
Gaston Thorn’s ensuing Presidency (1981-1985) coincided with a period of 
economic and political crisis. His appointment had not been supported by 
France and Britain, suspicious of his federalist views, and his term was 
overshadowed by a worsening relationship with the Thatcher government, in 
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particular over her demands for a budgetary rebate. Poor relations were 
further exacerbated by the reservations of other EC governments about 
Britain's confrontation with Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982 and 
by the opposition of some European leaders to Ronald Reagan's foreign 
policy, particularly the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. These 
were also years of international economic recession and episodic threats of 
trade wars. Notwithstanding his personal commitment to the federalist cause 
and the poor circumstances he had inherited, Thorn’s presidential period was 
commonly referred to as one of ‘Euro-sclerosis’. 
 
Jacques Delors (1985-1995), in contrast, enjoyed the support of a strong 
Franco-German axis and through his political skills and vision was able to 
advance along the line of least resistance, completion of the internal market to 
overcome ‘Euro-sclerosis’ (and hence also the Single European Act and the 
introduction of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council), and thereafter use 
the momentum gained to push for a Social Charter and Chapter and fiscal 
harmonization and, after German unification, economic and monetary union. 
The 1991 Maastricht Treaty also established the European Union and 
launched the Common Foreign and Security Policy. A key factor in Delors’ 
success was his understanding that ‘the EC heads of government had the 
potential to commit their countries to a significantly more pro-European 
approach than their foreign, finance or other departmental ministers …’ and 
that ‘the regular summit meetings of national leaders, held in the form of the 
European Council, offered a unique opportunity to mobilize strong, proactive 
leadership in favour of closer European integration.’ Teasdale and Bainbridge 
(2012) p. 203.  (For portraits and a comparative analysis of Hallstein, Jenkins 
and Delors, see Hussein Kassim (2012) and for portraits and analyses of all of 
the European Commission Presidents up until Barroso, see van der Harst and 
Voerman (2015). As to what Jean-Claude Juncker thinks of his illustrious 
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predecessor and the differences in the challenges they face, see the interview 
conducted with Juncker by the Jacques Delors Institute at Notre Europe3).  
 
After the third Jacques Delors Presidency (1992-94), as will be seen further on 
in this paper, the pendulum seemed to stick at the technocratic end of the 
scale. In a sense, Delors had made the position of Commission President 
almost too important and attractive. The Commisson Presidency seemed no 
longer to be primus inter pares, but primus. It was in any case around this 
time, at the end of ‘Delors III’, that the idea grew that the next President of the 
European Commission should be ‘one of us’ – that is, a former or current 
Head of State or Government. It is in any case an incontrovertible fact that 
every Commission President after Delors (Santer, Prodi, Barroso, Juncker) 
was previously a Prime Minister, whereas, with the exception of Thorn, every 
President before him was not and Prime Ministers, it should be noted in 
passing, are naturally used to centralized command structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         3 Published 22 January 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucs7GuiuEVA  
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3. The growing size of, and numbers in, the European 
Commission 
 
President or year Number Languages Monnet/Hallstein* 9 4 1973 Ortoli 13 5 1981 Thorn 14 6 1986 Delors 17 8 1995 Santer 20 10 2004** Barroso 25 19 2007 Barroso 27 22 (23) 2013 Barroso 28 23 (24)*** *For a brief period after the entry into force of the Merger Treaty on 1967 there were fourteen Commissioners, but the number was reduced back to nine in 1969. **The five larger Member States were reduced to one Commissioner each (in return for vote re-weighting in the Council) ***Irish has been an official language since 2007, albeit with a derogation.  
 
As the table/box shows, the Commission has been steadily growing in size 
and numbers since the ECSC and the original EEC, with their relatively small 
composition of six Member States, came into being. The Paris and Rome 
Treaties enshrined the tradition whereby larger Member States were entitled 
to two members of the European Commission, whereas the smaller Member 
States were entitled to one, thus creating several future headaches: namely, 
that there were more Commissioners than there were Member States and the 
conundrum of how to define a larger Member State. The Treaties also 
enshrined another immutable principle; namely, that each Member State was 
entitled to at least one Commissioner, no matter how small (and no matter 
that they were not supposed to be taking instructions). The Ortoli and Thorn 
Commissions were presented with relatively modest challenges in dealing 
with the 1973 and 1981 enlargements. The first brought one definitely larger 
Member State and two smaller. The second brought one definitely smaller. 
The Delors Commission was presented with a similarly incremental challenge 
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with the arrival of Spain (a larger Member State) and Portugal (smaller) in 
1986. The language count (up to eight from an initial four) was also relatively 
modest. Moreover, the insistent push to more integration and more tasks for 
the European Commission presented Delors with obvious solutions to the 
‘slack’ created by increasing numbers of Commissioners. His successor, 
Jacques Santer, was faced with a new wave of enlargement and a new, 
cultural and structural, challenge. The arrival of Sweden, Finland and Austria 
(the latter with honorary ‘northern’ status) was the first ‘northern’ 
enlargement since 1973, significantly altering the institution’s linguistic 
dynamics (favouring English rather than the previously predominant French) 
and its cultural mores (with an immediate emphasis on transparency and 
openness). Santer had also to absorb the new Commissioners by spreading 
the Commission’s political responsibilities out over twenty different 
portfolios.  
 
Just as the Delors III Presidency was accompanied by a common 
understanding that the job was now too big for anybody who had not 
occupied a Prime Ministership or Presidency, so the Santer Commission was 
accompanied by a common understanding that the Commission was 
becoming too big and increasingly unwieldy. To borrow from Paul Vanden 
Boeynants (a Belgian politician famous for his unique and acerbic sayings, 
typically delivered in a mixture of French and Dutch), "Trop is te veel en te veel 
is trop" ("too many is too much and too much is too many"). It was not just a 
question of the creation and distribution of portfolios (with the concomitant 
risk of ‘activism’ on the part of ambitious Commissioners). Twenty was more 
a mini-assembly than a management body and the mixture of numbers, 
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cultures and languages made collegiality and control increasingly difficult.4 
As if that were not enough, Santer was faced with an additional challenge – 
the inevitable backlash from the Delors activist heyday. Though it may now 
be forgotten, it was Jacques Santer who first coined the dictum ‘doing less 
better.’  
 
Another, even greater, imperative loomed ever larger, for it was becoming 
apparent that all of the Central and Eastern European countries and a number 
of so-called ‘micro states’ (Cyprus, Malta) would sooner or later (probably 
sooner, and possibly in one or two waves) be acceding to the European 
Union. Simply to extend membership of the European Commission to each of 
the new Member States would, it was considered, result in a huge and 
untenable increase in the number of Commissioners. The feeling, to borrow 
from Shakespeare, was: ‘O, that way madness lies; let me shun that; No more 
of that.’ (King Lear Act 3, scene 4, 17–22) The race was on to find a way to limit 
the number of members of the Commission before the next waves of 
enlargement (since otherwise each new Member State could be expected to 
insist on having its ‘own’ Commissioner). And the solution had to be elegant 
enough to avoid charges that the old Member States were ‘stitching up’ the 
new ones before they had even arrived. The result, in the end neither elegant 
nor efficient, was a Protocol on Enlargement appended to the 2001 Nice 
Treaty. This provided that:  
 
‘When the Union consists of 27 Member States, The number of Members of 
the Commission shall be less than the number of Member States. The Members 
of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation system based on the 
                                                        4 Of course, the provision of simultaneous interpretation (of a traditionally very high quality) enables the college to function efficiently as a meeting, but all Commission proposals must subsequently be tabled in all languages. 
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principle of equality, the implementing arrangements for which shall be 
adopted by the Council, acting unanimously. The number of Members of the 
Commission shall be set by the Council, acting unanimously.’ 
 
The process, during the Nice IGC, of unseemly horse-trading over numbers of 
Commissioners and MEPs and vote weights in the Council has been well 
described in Galloway (2001). The participants in the Nice IGC themselves 
came away knowing that they had not done enough, having merely passed 
on the hot potato to a future enlarged Union, which is why adjusting to 
enlargement was identified by the December 2001 Laeken Declaration as one 
of the two major challenges facing the European Union. The ensuing 
Convention and IGC duly considered the problem and would, in due course, 
reinforce the provisions set out in the Nice Protocol, but the vagaries of the 
negotiation and ratification process meant that the two waves of enlargement 
would soon crash down on the Union before what would ultimately be called 
the Lisbon Treaty could be ratified and implemented. Some progress had 
however been made inasmuch as the five largest Member States had at last 
accepted that, as of the end of the 1999-2004 Commission, they would be 
reduced to one Commissioner (the sweetener was ‘compensation’ in the form 
of re-weighted Council votes). Ironically, this reduction of five in the number 
of Commissioners coincided with the arrival of ten new Member States, each 
with a Commissioner. (Indeed, the two Barroso Commissions were faced with 
an increase of Commissioners from twenty to twenty-eight and an increase in 
working languages from ten to twenty-three/four.)5 
 
                                                        5 Of course, manageability is not only a question of sheer numbers.  Most national governments are much larger, especially if secretaries of state and under-secretaries of state are also taken into account. Governments have other reasons to be bound together (implementing a manifesto, for example). I am again grateful to David Galloway for making this point.   
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The result, it was hoped, would be a period of temporary ‘madness’, until the 
Lisbon Treaty could be ratified and implemented and only until 2014, because 
Article 17 thereof provided as follows: 
 
Lisbon Treaty, Article 17 
 
(4) The Commission appointed between the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and 31 October 2014, shall consist of one national of each 
Member State, including its President and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who shall be one of its Vice-
Presidents. 
5. As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of 
members, including its President and the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the 
number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, 
decides to alter this number. 
 
The members of the Commission shall be chosen from among the nationals of 
the Member States on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation between 
the Member States, reflecting the demographic and geographical range of all 
the Member States. This system shall be established unanimously by the 
European Council in accordance with Article 244 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.’ 
 
Unfortunately, this provision became bound up in the political debate leading 
up to the second, October 2009, Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
(following the June 2008 ‘no’). In order to convince the Irish people and secure 
a ‘yes’ vote, the European Council twice addressed the issue. First, at its 11-12 
December 2008 meeting, it decided as follows:  
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‘On the composition of the Commission, the European Council recalls that the 
Treaties currently in force require that the number of Commissioners be 
reduced in 2009. The European Council agrees that provided the Treaty of 
Lisbon enters into force, a decision will be taken, in accordance with the 
necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to 
include one national of each Member State.’ 
 
At a second, 18-19 June 2009 meeting, the European Council recalled and 
reaffirmed the December 2008 decision. The planned reduction in the number 
of members of the Commission was off the table indefinitely. When the issue 
raised its head in the run-up to the appointment of the 2014-2019 European 
Commission, the European Council once again addressed the issue, deciding 
at its 22 May 2013 meeting that:  
 
‘the Commission will continue to consist of a number of members equal to the 
number of Member States. This number also includes the Commission 
President and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission... 
The decision, which in effect maintains the current practice, will apply from 1 
November 2014. In view of its effect on the functioning of the Commission, the 
European Council will review this decision well in advance of the appointment 
of the first Commission following the date of accession of the 30th Member 
State or the appointment of the Commission succeeding that due to take up its 
duties on 1 November 2014, whichever is earlier.’ 
 
Since the current European Commission has put a temporary moratorium on 
further accessions to the European Union, the issue will presumably not be 
addressed again before the run-up to the appointment of the 2019-2024 
Commission. 
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Reducing the number of members of the Commission was a most obvious 
step in trying to retain its decision-making capacity and organisational 
efficiency. Other measures were also envisaged and some were enacted. A 
first was the gradual empowerment of the Commission President (dealt with 
separately below), particularly so as to give him/her more powers with regard 
to portfolio allocation. (Behind such allocations were value-judgements about 
‘more important’ portfolios or ‘better’ Commissioners, but evidently such 
considerations had to remain tacit.) Another was the possibility for the 
President (a power granted by the Amsterdam Treaty) to appoint Vice-
Presidents and hence de facto ‘senior’ Commissioners. It was a power that 
successive Commission Presidents, from Jacques Santer onwards, used to 
good effect, but always without any explicit identification of the other 
Commissioners as being somehow ‘junior’. Moreover, with Member State 
sensitivities constantly hovering in the background, the umbilical link 
between individual Commissioners and distinct portfolios was retained. 
Another measure frequently discussed in the 2000s was the possibility of 
creating ‘clusters’ of Commissioners. The umbilical portfolio-Commissioner 
link would be retained, but several Commissioners would be working on 
particular aspects of the same policy field. The most obvious policy area 
where such an arrangement was both called for and could work was external 
relations and it did indeed seem as though the Lisbon Treaty had provided 
for just that: 
 
Lisbon Treaty Article 18 
 
4. ‘The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the 
Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. 
He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent 
Martin Westlake 
17  
on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's 
external action.’ 
 
‘Coordinating other aspects’ was to imply coordinating the Commissioners 
responsible for those other aspects (for example, development and 
enlargement). For various political reasons this option was ducked in 2009, 
despite the creation of the position of High Representative. As a consequence 
of this and Irish referendum sensitivities, the first High Representative, Cathy 
Ashton, had to build the new European External Action Service from scratch 
whilst constantly traversing the globe in airplanes.  
 
But the idea of ‘clusters’ did not go away. In a 14 November 2013 Financial 
Times article the then Dutch Foreign Secretary (and future European 
Commission First Vice-President), Frans Timmermanns, argued for ‘greater 
focus and balance in EU governance’. It is worthwhile revisiting parts of the 
agenda he then proposed, none of it requiring Treaty change, and all of it 
since realised: 
 
- ‘to negotiate a European Governance Manifesto for the next five years with 
the member states, the incoming commission and parliament. It should lay 
down what Europe needs to focus on, and also what Europe needs to leave to 
the states. This will mean more Europe in some areas, and less in others. 
- ‘the EU needs to follow the logic of the treaty and create a smaller, reformed 
Commission with a president and vice-presidents heading a limited number of 
policy clusters. The vice-presidents would have the sole authority to initiate 
legislation. This would restore the commission’s focus and strengthen its 
clout…’ 
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On 18 March 2014, Timmermans co-authored an op-ed article with German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, published simultaneously in 
Handelsblatt and NRC Handelsblad. The article was a more muted version of 
the same calls for, inter alia, focus (foreign policy, economics, jobs, growth, 
EMU, subsidiarity), a ‘constructive debate on the EU’s political priorities’, 
‘stronger implementation’ and ‘a reinforced coordination role for the High 
Representative’ (code for clusters). The article emphasised joint intent. As the 
appointment process for the new Commission grew closer, so did speculation 
within the Brussels policy-making community as to whether, at last, the next 
Commission President would manage to introduce ‘clusters’ of some sort… 
  
4. The growing empowerment of the European 
Commission President 
 
Another way of dealing with the managerial challenge of the Commission’s 
frequent growth in size and numbers has been to strengthen the President’s 
powers and role, with the concomitant consequences of enhancing executive 
accountability on the one hand and of, effectively, undermining collegiality 
on the other. Article 158 of the Maastricht Treaty gave the president a 
consultative role in relation to the nomination of the other members of the 
Commission, though the power was weak and capped by the need for 
unanimity among the Member States: ‘The governments of the Member States 
shall, in consultation with the nominee for President, nominate the other 
persons whom they intend to appoint as members of the Commission.’ The 
Amsterdam Treaty inserted a provision that: ‘The Commission shall work 
under the political guidance of its President.’ The Nice Treaty further 
emphasised the President’s pre-eminence by elaborating on that provision in 
declaring (Art. 217) that the Commission President: 
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‘Shall decide on its internal organisation in order to ensure that it acts 
consistently, efficiently and on the basis of collegiality. 
2. The responsibilities incumbent upon the Commission shall be structured 
and allocated among its Members by its President. The President may 
reshuffle the allocation of those responsibilities during the Commission’s term 
of office. The Members of the Commission shall carry out the duties devolved 
upon them by the President under his authority. 
3. After obtaining the approval of the College, the President shall appoint Vice-
Presidents from among its Members. 
4. A Member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests, after 
obtaining the approval of the College.’ 
 
Of particular note were the related powers whereby the President could re-
shuffle portfolios at any time and could require the resignation of a 
Commissioner, although after obtaining the approval of the college – both 
doubtless informed by the unfortunate experiences of the Santer Commission. 
The Lisbon Treaty extended the President’s right to request resignation to the 
High Representative. As will be seen in Section 7 below, some of the 
incremental increases in the European Parliament’s powers in relation to the 
Commission also reinforced the role of the Commission President. In 2004 
José Manuel Barroso introduced one other highly significant change in the 
European Commission’s administrative structure: the Secretariat General 
became a service of the President. Under his predecessors, one of the 
Secretariat-General’s primary roles had been to support the college and 
ensure the collegiality of its functioning. Now it was to become more akin to a 
Cabinet Office, thus further underpinning the President’s growing Prime 
Ministerial role and function. 
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In passing, it is interesting to note in this context that the Convention 
proposed to give the President-elect significantly greater power with regard 
to the selection of individual Commissioners (I am grateful to Henning 
Christophersen, a member of the Convention’s Praesidium, for making this 
point.) However, this was predicated on the Commission comprising: ‘its 
President, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President, and thirteen 
European Commissioners selected on the basis of a system of equal rotation 
among the Member States’ (Article 25.3). Accordingly, Article 26.2 provided 
that: 
 
‘Each Member State determined by the system of rotation shall establish a list 
of three persons, in which both genders shall be represented, whom it considers 
qualified to be a European Commissioner. By choosing one person from each of 
the proposed lists, the President-elect shall select the thirteen European 
Commissioners for their competence, European commitment, and guaranteed 
independence.’ 
 
In the subsequent Inter-Governmental Conference the Member States shied 
away from such a strong provision, instead settling (Article I-27.2) for: 
 
‘The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list 
of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the 
Commission.’ 
 
Clearly, the IGC’s formulation was a re-assertion of the Member States’ role 
and power; the President needed to be stronger, perhaps, but not that strong. 
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5. The growing role of the European Council 
 
The European Commission has always enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with 
the European Council, although less so with the occasional Summits of Heads 
of State or Government that preceded it. The first such Summit was held in 
Paris in February 1961, convoked by French President Charles de Gaulle, who 
was pushing for a more intergovernmental approach to European integration 
– the Fouchet plan. When the plan collapsed, de Gaulle abandoned summitry, 
though a ceremonial Summit was held in 1967 to mark the tenth anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Walter Hallstein meanwhile continued 
to champion Jean Monnet’s vision; namely, the supranational approach and 
status of the European Commission. De Gaulle’s successor, Georges 
Pompidou, saw such summits more positively as a way of giving the 
integration process fresh impetus. Meetings were held in The Hague (1969), 
Paris (1972) and Copenhagen (1973). The positive developments that flowed 
out of these meetings could not be ignored by pro-integrationists. Pompidou’s 
successor, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, convoked two such meetings in Paris in 
1974. Both he and Pompidou pushed for more regular meetings of what he 
styled the ‘European Council’, against the scepticism of pro-integrationists 
and the Benelux countries, who feared a resurgence of Gaullist inter-
governmentalism. But Jean Monnet himself backed the proposal, arguing that 
such regular summitry would ‘enhance the authority of the European 
institutions and their capacity to act.’ The European Council thereafter met 
two or three times a year and found its first foothold in the Treaties through 
the 1986 Single European Act, later amended by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 
and again amended and enhanced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (when it became 
a fully-fledged institution with its own full-time presidency). 
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The brief pen portraits in Section 2 above of the Commission’s visionary 
Presidents gave a few examples of the symbiotic relationship at work. On the 
one hand, the rivalries; Hallstein’s tussles with De Gaulle; Jenkins’s tussles 
with Giscard d’Estaing; Delors’s tussles with Thatcher – each with the 
implication of being equal adversaries. On the other hand, the positives. For 
example, the waltz between Summits/European Councils and Commission 
Presidents, starting at the 1969 Summit, over plans for Economic and 
Monetary Union: Pompidou-Rey (Barre and Werner Reports); Giscard 
d’Estaing and Schmidt – Roy Jenkins (the European Monetary System); 
Mitterrand and Kohl – Delors (Economic and Monetary Union). As described 
above, Jacques Delors developed a particularly complicit working 
relationship with the European Council, but all of his successors recognised 
the unique political authority and authenticity that only the European Council 
could bring on major strategic issues – the sort of over-arching leadership that 
Jean Monnet had identified as being necessary. (For some colourful examples 
of such tussles and waltzes, see de Boissieu et al, 2015.) 
 
The formal creation of the European Council as an institution and, perhaps 
above all, the creation of the permanent/full-time President, consolidated this 
relationship, reinforced by the imperative of dealing with the post-2008 
economic and financial crisis. So big were the political stakes that power was 
strongly focussed at the level of heads of state and government. (The process 
is well-described in Van Rompuy, 2014.)  But the gradual process of 
consolidation of strategic power in the European Council had been under way 
for a long time and corresponded to a vision set out at some length by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her 2 November 2010 speech at the 
College of Europe in Bruges.  
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Merkel first argued that ‘it is not just the Parliament that deliberates on 
legislation but of course the Council as well. The Council is part of the 
European legislative process and is composed of representatives of the 
member states; representatives of the Commission participate in its 
deliberations.’ This she identified as the ‘Community method.’ But, she went 
on, ‘it should not be overlooked that the European Council, too, is part of the 
European Union; it is a European Union institution. The member states are 
constitutive elements of the Union, they are not its adversaries.’ This higher 
level she identified as the ‘Union method.’ In a sense, she was merely 
repeating the provisions of Article 9 B 1 of the Lisbon Treaty: ‘The European 
Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its 
development and shall define the general political directions and priorities 
thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.’ Thus the European 
Commission retains its sole right of legislative initiative but the European 
Council (and the political authority and strategic direction that it gives) is 
above the Community’s legislative procedure. A good example of this 
perceived superiority was provided by the June 2014 European Council when 
it adopted its guidelines for the future European Commission, notably it 
‘invited the EU institutions and the Member States to fully implement these 
priorities in their work,’ thus placing itself above them all: 
 
‘STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR THE UNION IN TIMES OF CHANGE 
The May 2014 European elections open a new legislative cycle. This moment 
of political renewal comes precisely as our countries emerge from years of 
economic crisis and as public disenchantment with politics has grown. It is the 
right time to set out what we want the Union to focus on and how we want it 
to function. The European Council agreed today on five overarching priorities 
which will guide the work of the European Union over the next five years: 
stronger economies with more jobs; societies enabled to empower and protect; a 
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secure energy and climate future; a trusted area of fundamental freedoms; 
effective joint action in the world.’ Conclusions – 26/27 June 2014 EUCO 
79/14 1 
  
It could be argued that the apparent novelty of the Spitzenkandidaten process 
and the consequent concentration on the power struggle between the 
European Parliament and the European Council, on the one hand, and the 
changing nature of the relationship between the European Commission and 
the European Parliament, on the other, distracted attention from another, 
equally significant and just as profound, change in the relationship between 
the European Commission and the European Council. In that context it has 
perhaps been overlooked that, under the provisions of the Treaties, the 
President of the European Commission is a full member of the European 
Council in his own right. The emergence of the European Council has thus 
strengthened the European Commission President’s role vis-à-vis his college 
of Commissioners, since it enables him to return from European Council 
meetings with edicts and imperatives with which he has himself agreed and 
to which he himself is party. 
  
 
6. The evolution of appointment mechanisms for the 
Presidency of the European Commission 
 
With regard to the Presidency of the ECSC’s High Authority, the Treaty of 
Paris foresaw a somewhat complicated procedure. Eight of the nine members 
were appointed by agreement among the Member States. A ninth was 
appointed/co-opted by the eight others, needing at least five votes to be 
appointed. The Treaty’s Article 11 declared that ‘The President and the Vice 
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President of the High Authority shall be designated from among the 
membership of the High Authority for two years, in accordance with the 
procedure provided for the designation of the members of the High Authority 
by the governments of the member States … the designation of the President 
and Vice President shall be made after consultation with the High Authority.’ 
Jean Monnet’s appointment as the first President of the High Authority was 
something of a foregone conclusion. His replacement by René Mayer, a 
former French Prime Minister, was a matter of continuity. The appointment of 
Mayer’s successor coincided with and was overshadowed by the creation of 
the first European Commission. 
 
Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the nine members were now all to be 
appointed by the Member States ‘acting in common agreement’ (Art. 158). 
The President and the two Vice-Presidents of the Commission were to be 
appointed from among its members ‘for a term of two years in accordance 
with the same procedure as that laid down for the appointment of members 
of the Commission’ (Art. 161) This wording was taken over directly from the 
Treaty of Paris, but this time there was no foregone conclusion with regard to 
the Presidency. There were three serious candidates: Jean Rey, Belgian 
Minister of Economics; Sicco Mansholt, Dutch Minister of Agriculture, and 
Walter Hallstein, a very special German state secretary. The position had still 
not been filled when the Treaties took effect on 1 January 1958. The Member 
States’ foreign ministers finally decided on 8 January 1958, opting for 
Hallstein. Thereafter, the Presidency seemed to remain in the gift of the 
Franco-German tandem, though his successors were, variously, Belgian, 
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Italian and Dutch, before the position returned to a Frenchman, François-
Xavier Ortoli.6 
 
What happened next is evocatively described by Ortoloi’s successor, Roy 
Jenkins, in his European Diary. The entry for 22 January 1976, during a ‘tour 
d’horizon’ in N° 10 Downing Street with the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, is 
as follows: 
 
‘In the course of the discussion Harold Wilson raised, but not very 
strenuously, the future presidency of the European Commission, in which a 
change was due at the beginning of 1977. There was a predisposition in favour 
of a British candidate, he said, but it was not sufficiently strong that the 
British government could nominate whomever they liked. Giscard d’Estaing 
and Schmidt had apparently reacted unfavourably for some reason or other to 
the suggestion of Christopher Soames, who was currently one of the five vice-
presidents of the Commission. They had more or less said, half-paraphrasing 
Henry Ford, that the British could confidently put forward any candidate they 
liked, provided it was Heath or Jenkins. I am not sure whether or not Wilson 
consulted Heath. In any event, he offered the job to me…’ 
 
With the appointment of his successor in 1981, Gaston Thorn, normal service 
seemed to have been continued – Thorn being very close to French President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The fascinating process that led to the appointment 
of Jacques Delors was detailed and documented in Charles Grant’s biography 
of Delors (1994). Grant sets the scene, shortly after an ill-tempered 16 July 
1984 meeting between Delors and French President François Mitterrand 
                                                         6 See van der Harst and Veorman (2015) for more detail on the appointments of Hallstein (p. 34), Rey (pp. 60-61), Malfatti (pp. 75-76 & 78), Mansholt (pp. 95 & 97), Ortoli (p. 119), Thorn (pp. 153-154) and Santer (pp. 201-202). 
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“Delors’ meeting with Mitterrand had left him no wiser on his chances of 
going to Brussels. Horse-trading among governments would decide the 
presidency of the European Commission, and it was the Germans’ turn. In 
Paris on 28 May Mitterrand had told Kohl that if the Germans did not have a 
candidate, he would suggest Cheysson – his clever, choleric and unpredictable 
foreign minister – or Delors. On 25 June, at the EEC’s Fontainbleau summit, 
Delors had an inkling that he might be in the running. Delors recalls:,‘I’d 
come to welcome Kohl when he got out of the helicopter. He took me aside and 
said … that he’d agree to a French president as long as his initials were JD 
and not CC.’” (pp. 57-58) 
 
At the Fontainebleau summit there was no formal discussion of the 
Commission presidency. Nevertheless, Jacques Attali’s Verbatim (pp. 659-60) 
recounts a conversation over breakfast between Kohl and Mitterrand. Kohl 
said he would not insist on a German president, and hinted that, because of 
Cheysson’s friendship with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, his own foreign minister 
whom he mistrusted, he would prefer Delors to Cheysson. Meanwhile, 
Margaret Thatcher, who had been positively briefed by her Foreign Secretary, 
Geoffrey Howe, told the French President that she could accept Delors, but 
not Cheysson.  
 
The rest, as they say, is history. But a number of aspects of the procedure 
described above are important to note in the context of this paper. In the first 
place, the position seemed very much to have still been in the gift of the 
Franco-German tandem (a convention apparently respected by the British 
government and by the other Member States, who would have needed 
subsequently to give their ‘common accord’). In the second place, the position 
seems to have been regarded as being relatively unimportant in the greater 
scheme of things, with Chancellor Kohl prepared to forego Germany’s ‘turn’ 
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because he had no suitable candidate waiting in the wings, and President 
Mitterrand prepared to put his second choice candidate into the position if the 
first choice wasn’t acceptable. (In similar vein, during the second Delors 
mandate Douglas Hurd, the then British Foreign Secretary could still, just 
about, get away with describing Jacques Delors as ‘the most senior official in 
Brussels’.) Perhaps above all, the whole decision-making procedure was 
informal and took place behind the scenes. Less evident from the account 
Grant gives is another set of informal conventions which were much spoken 
about in ‘Brussels’ and seemed to have been largely respected. These were 
that Presidents from large Member States (Hallstein, Malfatti, Ortoli, 
Jenkins,…) should be followed by Presidents from smaller Member States 
(Rey, Mansholt, Thorn,…), that Presidents from the ‘north’ should be 
followed by presidents from the ‘south’ (with France located somewhere in 
between), and that there should be balance between Presidents from the 
political left, right and centre. Lastly, as was seen in Section 2 above, the 
cumulative effect of the Delors Presidencies and the advances made under 
them was to transform the position of President into an important position 
that should, henceforth, be occupied by a former or current Prime Minister, 
but preferably a lower-key personality – two other informal conventions, in 
effect. 
 
At face value, therefore, the appointment of Delors’ successor, Jacques Santer, 
in 1994 was a perfect choice: he was a former Prime Minister; he was from a 
small Member State; he was from the ‘north’; he was on the right; he was a 
lower-key personality and he was acceptable to the Franco-German tandem. 
But Santer’s appointment was anything but straightforward, and another old 
convention – that such decisions should take place discreetly, behind closed 
doors – was abandoned during the process. The problem was bound up in the 
new convention about former Prime Ministers which, when taken together 
Martin Westlake 
29  
with the other old conventions, effectively narrowed the field of potential 
candidates to the current or former Prime Ministers of just seven Member 
States (the smaller ones), and then those candidates had to be on the right and 
willing to put their names forward. One such candidate, the Dutch Prime 
Minister, Ruud Lubbers, made no secret about his readiness to serve and was 
considered to be the front-runner. But his candidature was vetoed by the 
German Chancellor, Kohl, who bore Lubbers a grudge for the misgivings he 
had voiced about the speed of the German unification process. The still-
functioning Franco-German tandem had identified the Belgian Prime 
Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaene, as their preferred choice. The Independent 
newspaper reported on 24 June 1994: 
‘EU electors have just voted for a new European Parliament. But the choice of 
a President of the Commission is one of the least democratic processes in the 
European Union, with no input from outside the circle of heads of 
government. … Mr Dehaene is the leading candidate for one reason, which is 
that Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor, likes him. In addition, François 
Mitterrand, the French Prime Minister, is glad to see a candidate who speaks 
French. In general the other states follow the lead of these two. But any of 
those gathered around the dinner table tonight can veto, because each is a 
sovereign head of government.’ 
However, the British Prime Minister, John Major, dogged by his eurosceptical 
backbenchers and a hostile press, was badgered into wielding a very public 
veto on Dehaene’s candidature at the June 1994 Corfu European Council. 
Major, in turn, put forward the then European Commission Vice-President, 
Sir Leon Brittan, as his preferred candidate, but Brittan’s candidature was 
never seriously considered. The Heads of State or Government were, 
embarrassingly, unable to agree at Corfu and it took another hastily-arranged 
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summit in Brussels two weeks later for them to find unanimity around the 
candidature of Jacques Santer. An Economist editorial (8 January 1998), 
unaware of the fate that awaited the Santer Commission, described the 
procedure thus: 
 
‘The circumstances of his selection in 1994 were unpropitious. It was 
the turn of the Benelux countries to fill the post. Germany’s Helmut 
Kohl refused to countenance Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister, 
and Britain’s John Major vetoed the Franco-German choice of Jean-Luc 
Dehaene, the Belgian Prime Minister. By default, the job fell to Mr 
Santer, then Luxembourg’s prime minister, who did not really want the 
job. … Mr Santer, it seems, is destined to be the unknown president.’ 
 
Santer himself admitted that he ‘was not the first choice – but to become 
Commission president was not my first choice either.’ (Geoff Meade, 2008) On 
20 July 1994 the European Parliament, freshly elected in June, exercised the 
new right granted to it by the Maastricht Treaty and voted on whether to 
approve Santer as the nominee for Commission President. He scraped 
through with a mere 20 vote majority – which was clearly more a protest 
about the way the nomination procedure had been handled than a criticism of 
the quality of Santer’s candidature itself. This sorry procedure had three clear 
consequences. A first was that the European Commission was weakened by 
the whole affair and, in the post-Delors era, a number of Member States were 
happy to see that happen. A second was that the European Parliament’s role 
(explored further below) was manifestly reinforced; it had immediately 
demonstrated that its new right was not a technical nicety but a real power 
that it had the discipline and the political will to wield. A third was that, 
paradoxically, the procedure strengthened the Commission President’s hand 
in the nomination of his fellow Commissioners and the distribution of their 
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portfolios (also explored below). A fourth consequence, less germane to the 
theme of this paper, was the elevation, in the perceptions of the British media 
and of Conservative backbenchers, of the veto into an apparently 
indispensable weapon in the armoury of British Prime Ministers. (See, for 
example, Duncan Watts and Colin Pilkington, Britain in the European Union 
Today, third edition, Manchester University Press, 2005, especially, p. 54.) This 
section will pass a veil over the subsequent resignation of the Santer 
Commission (see Section 6 below) though, of course, it naturally weakened 
the Commission still further. (For a ringside account of the Santer 
Commission’s demise, see Priestley, 2008, pp. 145-202.) 
 
After the Santer debâcle, a more Prime Ministerial tone entered into 
considerations about the Commission Presidency, with an understandable 
emphasis on professionalism and managerialism. Romano Prodi was 
appointed with urgent unanimity by the Berlin European Council in March 
1999 although, ironically, his appointment respected all of the old 
conventions: a Social Democrat to follow a Christian Democrat; a southern, 
large country to follow a northern, small one; and a politician of naturally 
modest demeanour, if of serious intent. The perception of managerialism was 
well summed-up in a Bloomberg Businessweek report on 27 September 1999, 
under the headline ‘Romano Prodi: Europe’s First Prime Minister?’ 
 
‘When Italy’s Romano Prodi was designated last April as President of the 
European Commission, he had a strong mandate to push through radical 
changes in the vast, bureaucratic Brussels institution, which acts as the quasi-
government of Europe. … Prodi, a long-time senior manager in state industry 
and a former Prime Minister, was seen as someone who at least could put an 
honest face on a discredited body. The mild-mannered economist is taking that 
mandate and running with it. He is, in fact, looking like the first-ever Prime 
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Minister of Europe. … He has had more of a say that any of his predecessors in 
choosing his commissioners… He has also retained the power to fire them…’ 
 
The emphasis, almost suddenly, was on prime ministerial powers, quasi-
government, managerial ability and financial probity. The Prodi Commission 
did more than undertake a massive programme of administrative and 
budgetary reform – it notably oversaw the introduction of euro notes and 
coins and welcomed in the massive wave of enlargement in 2004. 
Nevertheless, it was primarily characterised, and is primarily recalled, as 
being a quintessentially managerial reform body.  
 
There was perhaps, then, an inevitable pushback towards a more political 
emanation of the Commission in 2004, at the end of the Prodi years but other, 
deeper political forces were also at work. In particular, Europe’s major 
political families and political groupings had been steadily coalescing since 
the first direct elections to the European Parliament in June 1979. Already, in 
the mid-1980s, the EPP began to convene ‘party summits’ before European 
Council meetings, and these meetings ‘played a part in solidifying support 
among centre-right leaders for Economic and Monetary Union in the years 
from 1989 onwards…’ (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012, p. 406) The Maastricht 
Treaty’s Article 138(a) stated that ‘Political parties at European level are 
important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to 
forming a European awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the 
Union.’ Similar wording was, ultimately, carried over into the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Confederation of Socialist Parties converted itself into the Party of 
European Socialists in November 1992 and itself began to hold party summits 
before European Council meetings. The European Liberal, Democrat and 
Reform (ELDR) Party followed in December 1993.  
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Consciousness of a more party political dimension to the European 
Commission grew in this post-Maastricht period. It became a common 
practice to count the number of ‘socialist’ or ‘social democrat’ or ‘Christian 
Democrat’ or ‘Liberal’ members of the European Commission, for example 
(and the same practice grew with regard to the European Council). An 
important part of the reason for this was that Commissioners would attend 
the pre-European Council summits of their respective European political 
parties and their respective political groupings within the European 
Parliament, thus in the eyes of some abandoning at least some of their guise 
as being completely independent in the execution of their duties. Mixed into 
this growing consciousness was the old claim by the European left that the 
Delors and Prodi Commissions had, somehow, been left-of-centre and by the 
centre-right that the (‘Christian Democrat’) Santer Commission had been 
brought down by the left in the European Parliament. The then President of 
the PES Group in the EP, Pauline Green, had certainly played a key role in the 
events leading up to the Santer Commission’s resignation (again, see 
Priestley, 2008, pp. 145-202). There was a growing sense that the Christian 
Democratic centre-right should – and could – have its way. The 
unprecedented 2004 wave of enlargement changed the political balance 
within the Prodi Commission and enlarged the EPP Group significantly 
within the European Parliament (the 1999 ‘sweet deal’ with the British 
Conservatives had also put wind in the Group’s sails). And there were now 
eleven EPP Heads of State or Government in the European Council. There 
was a double sense; that the Christian Democrat right should take the 
European integration process in hand, and that the EPP alone was strong 
enough to act as a majority on its own. As will be seen below (Section 9), the 
Convention and ensuing Inter-Governmental Conference had made provision 
for some sort of linkage between the elections to the European Parliament and 
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the Presidency of the European Commission.7 It was felt that 2004 could mark 
a new, EPP, departure. Confirmation of both that ambition and that it had 
effectively been realised came in the Foreword to the EPP-ED 2004 Yearbook, 
penned by then then EPP-ED Chairman, Hans-Gert Pöttering: 
 
‘The EPP-ED Group emerged from the European elections in June once again 
as by far the largest political group in the European Parliament, with 268 
MEPs from all 25 Member States of the European Union. Using this strength 
in the interest of Europe’s citizens is for us a responsibility and a political 
commitment. The EPP-ED Group scored a major political success with the 
appointment by the Heads of State or Government on 29 June of José Manuel 
Durão Barroso to the office of new Commission President. The EPP succeeded, 
through early implementation of the provisions of the new Constitution, in 
appointing a candidate originating from the political family which won the 
European elections. The EPP was thus able to impose its candidate in defiance 
of an agreement already reached between some Heads of State or Government 
before the European elections. 
 
The new Commission under its President José Manuel Durão Barroso began 
work on 22 November after the European Parliament endorsed the new 
Commission team by a large majority of 449 votes on 18 November (251 
against and 44 abstentions). … The EPP-ED Group always consistently 
supported Barroso during the difficult period of putting together the new team 
right up until the election of the entire Commission. Following election by the 
European Parliament, President Barroso can set to work with a strong team 
on tackling the issues concerning the future of Europe over the next five                                                         7 For the ‘pre-history’ of what they term ‘parliamentarising the election of the Commission 
President,’ see Penalver Garcia and Priestley, pp. 49-51. However, whilst a number of federalist MEPs from other political groupings might have written or spoken about the possibility of an 
electoral link, it was the EPP that decisively ‘ran with the ball.’ 
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years.’ (my emphasis – the rival candidate obliquely referred to was the 
former Liberal Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt) 
 
Thus, the new Commission President was clearly regarded and portrayed as 
being an EPP (Christian Democrat) choice. His initial political language with 
regard to liberalisation and deregulation and his apparent lack of enthusiasm 
for social policy further consolidated the impression that Barroso was going 
to be not only a Prime Ministerial President of the Commission, but one intent 
on leading a centre-right policy approach to EU politics and policies. 
 
On the same basis, the EPP again endorsed Barroso as its candidate for a 
second term during the 2009 European election campaign and, after the EPP 
again ‘won’ the elections, was able to secure his nomination by the European 
Council on 17 June 2009 (this time with 431 votes in favour, 251 against and 44 
abstentions). On 16 September 2009, Barroso was duly re-approved by the 
European Parliament for another five years. Towards the end of his ten years 
in office Barroso was sometimes heard to say, almost plaintively, that he had 
constantly had to work in the shadow of the Delors Commissions but, in 
truth, it was Barroso, and the EPP Group that championed him, that first 
invited the comparison. Barroso’s determination to remain in office for two 
full mandates – ten years – inevitably invited further comparison with the 
only other Commission President to have served for ten years – Jacques 
Delors (though in his case it was two four-year mandates and one two-year 
mandate). Whatever Barroso’s personal political inclinations, his 
administrations were not, in the end, notably partisan. A concentration on the 
European Union’s 2010 Strategy led to emphases on climate change, the 
subsequent Europe 2020 strategy and as of 2008, on dealing with the 
economic and financial crisis that beset the European Union. But, for the 
purposes of this paper, it is important to note that he was the first 
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Commission President appointed after having been, in Pöttering’s words, ‘a 
candidate originating from the political family which won the European 
elections.’ The – correct – implication was that Barroso would not be the last. 
 
 
7. The growing powers and role of the European 
Parliament 
 
As described elsewhere, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, two of the EU’s truly supranational institutions, have always 
enjoyed a symbiotic relationship and a large degree of complicity (Westlake, 
1994, 1 & 2). On the one hand, the Commission seeks legitimacy. On the other, 
the Parliament seeks control. Both have traditionally distinguished 
themselves from the intergovernmental Council and the European Council. 
The advent of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 – a 
development long sought after by the Parliament and long supported by the 
Commission – represented a sea-change in relations between the two. The 
Parliament, an inherently militantly federalist organisation, had long since 
developed a blue-print designed to both further democratise and further 
federalise the Continent. On 14 February 1984, under the impulsion of veteran 
Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli, the European Parliament adopted a Draft 
Treaty Establishing the European Union. It would remain remarkably faithful 
to the main details of that blueprint over the next thirty-five years, as it 
followed a joint strategy of ‘small steps’ (developing conventions and 
precedents, frequently with the Commission’s complicity) and ‘big steps’ 
(winning, or banking, constitutional innovations at subsequent IGCs). Thus, 
already in 1980 the Parliament unilaterally held a symbolic/indicative vote on 
Gaston Thorn’s nomination as President of the European Commission and 
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would do so thereafter in 1984, 1988, 1992 (Delors, I, II and III) and 1994 
(Santer). Finally, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty provided that: ‘The 
governments of the Member States shall nominate by common accord the 
person they intend to appoint as President of the Commission; the 
nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament.’ (My emphases in 
bold throughout this analysis.) (This, it should be noted, went beyond the 
ambitions of the ‘Spinelli Treaty’ which had provided, in its Article 25, that:  
‘At the beginning of each parliamentary term, the European Council shall 
designate the President of the Commission. The President shall constitute the 
Commission after consulting the European Council.’) 
 
The 1993 Maastricht Treaty synchronised the Commission’s and the 
European Parliament’s five-year terms of office and provided (Article 158) 
that:  
 
‘The President and the other members of the Commission thus nominated shall 
be subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. After 
approval by the European Parliament, the President and the other members of 
the Commission shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of 
the Member States.’ 
 
‘The Parliament interpreted this as bestowing on it the right to approve, and 
therefore also to veto, the member governments’ nominations.’ (Kassim, 2012) 
The Parliament certainly sought to organise parliamentary hearings with 
individual nominees for the Commission in 1994, but it was the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s provision that; ‘The governments of the Member States shall, by 
common accord with the nominee for President, nominate the other persons 
whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission,’ that gave the 
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Parliament a solid Treaty basis for the organisation of parliamentary hearings 
for individual candidates, and thereafter the practice became generalised. 
 
The near miss in 1999 of censure, headed off only by the pre-emptive 
resignation of the Santer Commission, represented a massive leap forward in 
the overall power balance between the two institutions in favour of the 
Parliament. The Nice Treaty introduced a further quantum leap forward, by 
reducing the former unanimity requirement in the European Council to 
qualified majority vote; ‘The Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of 
State or Government and acting by a qualified majority, shall nominate the 
person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission; the nomination 
shall be approved by the European Parliament.’ In 2004, the European 
Parliament first drew blood through the parliamentary hearings procedure, 
when Rocco Butiglione was obliged to withdraw his nomination and Igrida 
Udre was also pushed out and the President-elect, José Manuel Barroso, had 
to change the portfolio of another Commissioner-nominee before winning 
parliamentary approval for his proposed college. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty 
introduced the provision that led to the Spitzenkandidaten procedure:  
 
‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after 
having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for 
President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the 
European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not 
obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected 
by the European Parliament following the same procedure.’ 
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These incremental increases in the involvement of the Parliament have made 
the process increasingly political. Notably: 
 
- nominees for the Presidency have to explain to the Parliament, in 
increasing detail, their intended policies; 
- nominees for the Presidency may have to engage in policy 
commitments and/or make policy concessions; 
- nominees for the Presidency appear before the European Parliament’s 
political groups and have to build and subsequently rely on the 
support of coalitions, whilst also avoiding the creation of too much 
enmity among the other, less supportive, groups; 
- nominees for the Presidency may, following the hearings with 
individual nominees, have to reshuffle portfolios. 
 
Last but not least, nominees for the Presidency have to draft policy 
‘manifestos’. The way in which these have become increasingly political can 
be illustrated by comparing José Manuel Barroso’s 2009 ‘Political Guidelines 
for the Next Commission’ with Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2014  ‘A New Start for 
Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change, 
Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission’. 
 
This section ends by addressing the following question:  what exactly did the 
Lisbon Treaty want in this context? In some language versions (for example, 
English, French, Italian) of the Treaty’s Article 9 D, the European Council 
proposes a candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission after 
‘taking into account the elections’. And yet in other language versions 
(German and Spanish, for example), the Article talks about ‘taking into 
account the result of the elections’. There is a significant difference between 
these two versions. Since the European Council had to decide on several 
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different positions (Presidency of the Commission, High Representative, 
Presidency of the European Council), ‘taking into account the elections’ could 
mean ensuring a balance of the best-performing political families when 
making nominations to those various positions. But ‘taking into account the 
result’ (and not ‘the results’) could only mean, more narrowly, nominating for 
the Presidency of the Commission the representative of the political family 
which had won the most seats. Since before they are published the draft 
Treaties are pored over by specialised teams of jurists-linguists to ensure that 
all language versions are harmonized, this discrepancy is mysterious. As 
Section 9 below explores, the English version was a perhaps watered-down 
version of what the more ambitious of the Treaty’s draftsmen had initially 
intended in the Convention and the ensuing IGC. In any case, the stronger 
wording in the German version clearly influenced the nature of the debate in 
that country’s media, as the next section will show… 
 
 
8. Increasing German concerns about the democratic 
nature of the European Union 
 
Germany, like the West German Republic before it, has always harboured 
strong concerns about the democratic structure of the European Union and 
has always championed the European Parliament as a democratic 
counterweight to more intergovernmental developments. Thus, it was the 
German government that pushed for direct elections to the European 
Parliament as a counter-weight to the institutionalisation of the European 
Council, it was the German Government’s insistence, in the early 1970s, that 
led to the Parliament gaining its first significant budgetary powers in return 
for the development of own resources. Similarly, it was at German 
Martin Westlake 
41  
government insistence that the European Parliament received its first 
embryonic legislative powers in the Single European Act as a democratic 
counter-balance to the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting in the 
Council of the European Union. Throughout all of this period Germany 
enjoyed the same rights and status as the other large Member States (France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom), but the unification of Germany in 1990 led to 
structural recognitions of Germany’s new status as the largest Member State – 
it now had more members in the European Parliament (99) and ultimately 
would be granted a different weighting in the Council of the European Union. 
German unification, coupled with the consolidation of economic and 
monetary union and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s continued electoral success 
has led some commentators to write of German ‘hegemony’. It is not a term 
with which most German politicians and thinkers feel at all comfortable and 
has given rise to considerable soul-searching, epitomised by the recent 
publications of two post-war great German philosophers; Jürgen Habermas, 
The Crisis of the European Union – A Response (2012) and the late Ulrich Beck, 
German Europe (2012). Leaving aside their more partisan criticisms of Angela 
Merkel and her particular insistence on austerity and no further debt write-
offs in the case of Greece, the common argument in both books is that 
Germany’s new-found status and power must be firmly anchored in a more 
democratic Union. Not surprisingly, when German thinkers think about 
democracy, they naturally tend to think in terms of their own version of 
democracy.  
 
At the same time, a 2011 ruling of Germany’s constitutional court regarding 
the democratic nature of the 2009 European elections shook a little the 
traditional consensus in favour of looking to the Parliament as the obvious 
democratic counterweight in the European Union. In a confusing judgement, 
the Court held that the 5% electoral threshold established by the German 
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European Elections Act was in breach of the constitutional principles of equal 
suffrage and equal opportunities for political parties, and declared the 
threshold void. According to the Court, the principle of equal suffrage 
required that every vote had the same influence on the composition of a 
representative body. The Court held that electoral thresholds could indeed be 
justified by the need for operability of a parliament. However, in the view of 
the Court, the entry of more parties to the EP would not jeopardise its 
functioning and stability, pointing out that the EP does not – as distinct from 
the Bundestag – elect a government. Nor, it maintained, does the European 
Commission depend in the same way on the support of a stable 
parliamentary majority. (Almost as an aside, the Court added that therefore, 
because of differing population sizes and degressive proportionality for the 
distribution of parliamentary seats, the Parliament could not be considered 
‘democratic’, since votes were not of equal weight.) (European Parliamentary 
Research Service, 2014) 
 
Such developments led to an expectation, particularly pronounced in 
Germany, that something new, or different, had to happen in the 2014 
European elections, particularly given the abandonment, following the 
Court’s ruling, of the 5% threshold and the concomitant expectation that a 
number of smaller parties (including the far right National Democratic Party) 
would benefit and win representation. Given all of this, it was no surprise that 
the Spitzenkandidaten process only really enjoyed a high profile in Germany 
(Austria was the only other Member State where the process was at all 
noticed).8 It was this expectation that led a reluctant German Chancellor to 
bow to the pressure from the EPP and go along with the procedure. And it                                                         8 Of course, there were other reasons as to why public interest was quite so high, including a German candidate (Martin Schulz) from the junior partner in the grand coalition, Schulz’s feisty campaign and the prominent backing he received from his party, and the fluent German of his main opponent, Jean-Claude Juncker, allowing for immediately accessible televised debates and high media interest.  
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was the same expectation that led to media outrage in Germany when, 
following the EPP’s ‘win’ in the June 2014 European elections, David 
Cameron belatedly attempted to stop Jean-Claude Juncker being proposed by 
the European Council. In a furious Bild op-ed article (29 May 2014), its 
publisher, Matthias Döpfner, described Cameron's opposition to Juncker as a 
scandal. 
 
‘That much is certain: Europeans want Juncker as EU president. Schulz got 
the second best result. A third, who didn't stand for election, can't be allowed 
to get the job. That would turn democracy into a farce. You may get away with 
something like that in the GDR or in far-right banana republics. But not in 
the EU. Or otherwise it will abolish itself.’ 
 
As Der Spiegel declared in an editorial on 3 June: “The EU cannot … refuse to 
give the people of Europe what was assured to them before the election – that 
they could use their vote to determine the next president of the European 
Commission.” In a 9 June 2014 Washington Post blog post, Simon Hix and 
Stuart Wilks-Heeg demonstrated the extraordinary difference in the degree of 
coverage in the German press (considerable) and the UK (almost none).  In 
effect, these expectations revealed differing visions of what democracy should 
be at the EU level. Thus, while Jurgen Habermas told the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine newspaper that ‘if EU leaders force through an alternative 
candidate (other than Juncker) then in future nobody can be expected to vote 
in European elections,’ (reported in the Financial Times, 6 June 2014) David 
Cameron argued, in a 13 June 2014 Irish Times article: ‘Supporters of 
Spitzenkandidaten argue that elections have happened, the people of Europe 
have chosen Jean-Claude Juncker as commission president and that it would 
be undemocratic for elected national leaders to choose anyone else. It is not an 
attack on Mr Juncker, an experienced European politician, to say this is 
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nonsense.’ The European Parliament adopted for its publicity campaign for 
the 2014 European elections the slogan ‘This time it’s different.’ In Germany, 
expectations that it should be different ran particularly high. 
  
9. The European People’s Party’s constitutional and 
federal vision 
 
In June 2014 the European People’s Party published a Factsheet entitled ‘The 
story of the “Spitzenkandidaten”’. It began with a straightforward affirmation: 
‘The idea of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ or lead candidates was born of the 
Constitutional Convention and bears the signature of the European People’s 
Party.’ The Factsheet described how, at the October 2002 EPP Congress 
meeting in Estoril (Portugal) preceding the work of the European Convention, 
EPP leaders together drafted a ‘Constitution for a strong Europe’ which 
contained an article seeking to introduce greater democratic legitimacy into 
European elections. The draft article read as follows: 
 
‘A candidate for the President of the European Commission should be 
proposed to the European Parliament by the European Council in light of the 
outcome of European elections and by qualified majority vote.  
 
The European Parliament should give or withhold its approval by majority 
vote. This would give European political parties the opportunity to present 
their own candidates in the framework of the campaign for European elections. 
It would ensure a more personalised election campaign and increase 
democratic control and support of the European Commission.’ 
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Among the ten EPP Prime Ministers who attended the EPP’s Estoril Congress 
were José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker. In a remarkable piece of 
documentary archaeology, the Factsheet goes on to show how the initial 
provision became an EPP fraction proposal in the Constitutional Convention 
which was then amended by the Presidium and further amended by the 
Convention and then again by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference 
before being taken over in identical form by the Lisbon Treaty, becoming 
Article 17(7). (It was during the lengthy drafting and re-drafting process that 
the article’s wording oscillated between ‘the elections’ and ‘the results of the 
elections’.) Thus the ‘lead candidates’ idea was indeed an EPP innovation 
and, as was demonstrated in Section 6 above, was one that the EPP chose to 
anticipate in 2004 and 2009. Moreover, it was an innovation that the EPP was 
determined to see fully implemented in 2014, considering the words ‘the 
results’ to be implicit, if not explicit. 
 
In his September 2012 State of the Union address, the Commission President, 
José Manuel Barroso, declared that: ‘An important means to deepen the pan-
European political debate would be the presentation by European political 
parties of their candidate for the post of Commission President at the 
European elections already in 2014.’ Estoril revisited, in other words. At the 
EPP’s October 2012 Bucharest Congress a resolution was adopted calling on 
the new EPP Presidency to ‘agree a procedure and start an internal 
nomination process of a common candidate for the president of the next 
European Commission, as allowed for by the Treaties, to be presented to the 
electorate as an EPP frontrunner during the election campaign.’ In November 
2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging ‘the European 
political parties to nominate candidates for the Presidency of the Commission 
and expects those candidates to play a leading role in the parliamentary 
electoral campaign.’ In March 2013 the European Commission published a 
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Recommendation entitled ‘Support for a candidate for President of the 
European Commission.’ Drafted by European Commission Vice-President 
Viviane Reding (EPP), it declared that ‘European and national political parties 
should make known, ahead of the elections to the European Parliament, the 
candidate for the function of the President of the European Commission they 
support and the candidate’s programme.’ An accompanying communication 
explained the reasoning behind the recommendation. The Commission 
adopted a further communication in March 2013, on ‘Preparing for the 2014 
European elections: further enhancing their democratic and efficient conduct.’ 
Thus, the stage had been set. 
 
Meanwhile, at its December 2009 Prague Congress, the Party of European 
Socialists, painfully aware that it had ‘lost’ in 2004 and 2009, and that it had 
been unable to present a common candidate in 2009 (in part because of 
misgivings about the Spitzenkandidaten procedure), adopted a Resolution 
entitled ‘A New Way Forward, A Stronger PES,’ including a resolve to 
designate its own candidate before the 2014 European elections. Thereafter, a 
campaign grew for the candidate to be selected through PES primaries and a 
working group was established. Basing itself on the working group’s 
conclusions, the November 2011 Brussels PES Council meeting decided that 
the PES would indeed designate its candidate for Commission president 
through primaries which were to take place in each of its member parties and 
organisations, with the results being ratified at an extraordinary PES 
Congress. In the event, during the official nomination period (October 2013) 
21 PES member parties nominated Martin Schulz as the ‘common candidate’, 
so he was duly selected on 6th November as the candidate designate. The 1 
March 2014 Rome PES electoral congress formally ratified his election. As 
promised at the outset, this paper will not examine the details of the process 
that led to Martin Schulz being selected. The point is that, this time around, it 
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seemed that the PES had the wind in its sails, especially given favourable 
opinion polls that seemed to give the party a small lead as the European 
election campaign proper got under way. 
 
Similarly, this paper will not examine the details of the process that led to 
Jean-Claude Juncker being selected as the EPP’s candidate. However, it is 
important to note that, unlike in 2004 and 2009, several heads of state or 
government, including the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, together with 
the (EPP) President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, 
expressed reticence about the appropriateness of the Spitzenkandidaten 
procedure, primarily because of what it would do to the overall institutional 
balance. Part of the reason was also bound up in the fact that Merkel had not 
taken the idea seriously when Martin Schulz was first endorsed and started 
campaigning. By the time she had woken up to his growing media coverage 
and the favourable polls, the procedure was a fait accompli, raising the 
possibility that a CDU Chancellor could end up endorsing an SPD candidate 
for the Presidency of the Commission. Thus, if the procedure was now, 
grudgingly, accepted, it was vital that the EPP should win or, at the least, not 
lose the European elections. Although the European People’s Party (EPP) had 
started preparing its campaign in June 2013 it did not finally select its chosen 
candidate until its March 2014 Dublin Congress. Jean-Claude Juncker, backed 
by Angela Merkel, was nominated over Michel Barnier (Valdis Dombrovskis 
withdrew), 382 votes to 245. In the light of what was subsequently to happen, 
Juncker’s availability for the role was a stroke of luck; he had only become 
free for such a role because of a ‘Spycatcher’-type scandal which had 
prematurely brought down his government. 
 
The bare facts of the ensuing process were that Schulz and Juncker, together 
with the other four nominees, toured Europe (where they were allowed to do 
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so), and debated more-or-less together on television nine times (including set-
piece debates in Maastricht, Cologne, Florence, Brussels and Hamburg). In the 
22-25 May 2014 elections, the EPP won more seats than the PES (221 v 191; 
29.43% v 25.43%). The Parliament subsequently insisted that Jean-Claude 
Juncker should be chosen by the European Council as its proposed President 
of the European Commission, with the implication that any other candidate 
would not get the parliamentary majority required. David Cameron voiced 
his opposition to such an option, primarily because it would change the 
institutional balance of power and was not explicitly provided for in the 
Treaties. Merkel seemed at first to try to placate him (not only because of his 
threats about Brexit but because she had previously sympathised with that 
point of view) but her hand was forced (or seemed to have been forced) by 
public opinion back home. In any case, after having seemed to waver on the 
principle, she publicly and very solidly backed the person, Jean-Claude 
Juncker.9 Cameron subsequently forced a vote in the European Council on 27 
June 2014, which he lost (only Hungary voted with him). The result, as a 28 
June 2014 Financial Times editorial put it was that: ‘For the first time in their 
history, they have endorsed a commission boss whom they did not choose.’ 
Having been proposed by the European Council, Juncker’s nomination was 
approved by the European Parliament on 15 July by 422 votes (in a secret 
ballot). The Juncker Commission as a whole was approved by the Parliament 
on 22 October 2014, by 426 votes to 210, with 67 abstentions. Among the 
innovations that he was able to bring in, relying on the support of the grand 
coalition of the EPP and PES Groups that had earlier forced the European 
Council to nominate him were: a ten-point policy programme, a more 
sophisticated version of ‘clusters’ (described as ‘project teams’, and with 
overlapping memberships) of Commissioners on specific policy themes                                                         9 Those close to the process argue that, whatever the media speculation, the Chancellor actually never wavered in her support for Juncker’s candidature. 
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(including external relations); seven Vice-Presidents with no portfolios 
exercising filtering roles, and a strong ‘enforcer’-style first Vice-President in 
the person of Frans Timmermans who, as was seen in Section 3 above, had 
been the author of the 14 November 2013 Financial Times article that had 
called forcefully for a ‘reformed Commission with a president and vice-
presidents heading a limited number of policy clusters. The vice-presidents 
would have the sole authority to initiate legislation.’ 
 
There were some fortuitous developments during the process briefly 
described here, not the least of them the unexpected availability of Jean-
Claude Juncker (in the circumstances, the perfect candidate) and the EPP’s 
stronger-than-expected showing in the European elections. Nevertheless, as 
this paper has sought to show, the election of Jean-Claude Juncker and of his 
reformed Commission was not the late opportunistic power-grab that has 
frequently been portrayed. Rather, it was the execution of the latest 
instalment of a carefully-laid plan, a blueprint that began in Estoril in 2002. 
Behind it the chief concerns remained: transparency, responsiveness, 
accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and … keeping the show, and the 
democratic federalist blueprint, on the road… (on the importance of 
blueprints and of the draftsmen of blueprints, see Westlake, 1998). 
 
 
10. Conclusions: Chronicle of an Election Foretold 
 
This paper set out to address the question as to how and why Jean-Claude 
Juncker became President of the European Commission in 2014. As promised 
at the outset it has not considered in detail the political processes around the 
selection and election of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten but, rather, has 
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attempted to identify and describe a series of longer-term trends, arguing that 
Jean-Claude Juncker’s Presidency of the European Commission lies at the 
confluence of all of those trends and transitions. Thus, Juncker’s Presidency, 
like his Commission, has sought clearer lines of command and of legitimacy 
in an increasingly crowded institutional landscape, in particular vis-à-vis the 
European Council (of which Juncker is a member as Commission President, 
as well as a former longstanding member, as Luxembourg Prime Minister). 
Juncker may or may not be a charismatic individual, but his Presidency 
stands at the current end of a long process away from charismatic, visionary 
Presidents and his Presidential ‘style’ is suitably undemonstrative and quietly 
efficient. Equally, his Presidency stands at the current end of a long process 
away from the purely technocratic and towards the more political, and away 
from the more collegial to the more Prime Ministerial. In the face of the 
Member States’ continued failure to reduce the overall number of members of 
the Commission, Juncker has used the President’s growing powers and his 
Presidential authority (plus a unique quantity of high quality Commissioners, 
including several former Prime Ministers) to drive through the concept of 
‘project teams’ (more dynamic and potentially overlapping than ‘clusters’) 
and the specific filtering role of his first Vice-President, and his six other Vice-
Presidents (including the High Representative), and he has succeeded in 
doing away with the previous inviolable linkage between Commissioners and 
portfolios (cleverly, from the top down, rather than the bottom up) and, 
through his ‘working methods,’ further centralised Presidential control, thus 
making an unprecedented and structural attempt to bring the large and 
unwieldy Commission under control (on the new internal methods see, for 
example, New Europe, 2015).  
 
At another level, Jean-Claude Juncker’s presidency is a personification of the 
EPP’s ongoing constitutional ambition and federal vision. His presidency is 
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the personification of the EPP’s continued numerical superiority in the 
European Parliament (though the absolute majority requirement obliged him 
to rely on a grand EPP-S&D coalition). He will be more answerable to the 
European Parliament and more responsive to it, as his portfolio reshuffles 
demonstrate, but he will almost certainly seek equidistance between it and the 
European Council. Though Jean-Claude Juncker also had the backing of 
French President François Hollande, his presence at the head of the 
Commission is clearly a result in part of increased German influence and of 
German concerns but clearly not with a view to somehow Germanising the 
Union, but, rather, democratising it in a way that will reassure a new 
Germany increasingly uncomfortable with its membership of what it 
increasingly saw as a previously undemocratic club. Perhaps above all, 
Juncker’s presidency represents a further step in the normalisation of the 
Commission – it is no longer a ‘pure hybrid’ but a more ‘ordinary executive’ 
(see Anchrit Wille, 2013). Perhaps the days of visionaries and collegiality have 
forever gone, or perhaps Juncker is a new visionary. 
 
It seems clear that the Spitzenkandidaten process, on the other hand, is here to 
stay; the genie cannot be put back into the bottle, despite the June 2013 
European Council’s conclusion that ‘Once the new European Commission is 
effectively in place, the European Council will consider the process for the 
appointment of the President of the European Commission for the future, 
respecting the European Treaties.’10 But what will this new development 
mean for the Union’s institutional balance, or is it simply too early to tell? 
Writing as recently as 2012, Teasdale and Bainbridge (2012) described how:                                                         10 On the other hand, on 11 November 2015, as this paper was going to press, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on ‘the reform of the electoral law of the European Union.’ The 
resolution proposes a set of changes to the EU’s electoral law that would inter alia include formalizing the Spitzenkandidaten process by enshrining it explicitly. See also De La Baume (2015).  
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‘The fact that the Commission is appointed, rather than directly-elected, 
sometimes gives rise to criticism. However, it is precisely the fact of the 
Commission’s not being elected that allows the present institutional balance to 
be maintained – a balance broadly satisfactory to the governments of all the 
member states, especially those of the smaller states. The procedure under 
which an incoming Commission must now secure the approval of the 
European Parliament is thought to give the institution greater democratic 
legitimacy, while falling well short of conferring on it an entirely independent 
political mandate.’ (p. 302) 
 
Moreover, the trends described in this paper will continue, with future 
Commission presidents, candidates, European Parliaments, European 
Councils, and so on, all seeking to build on (or overturn) the precedents that 
have been set. Hence a concluding question: what happens next time, in 2019? 
Will Member State governments from the two big party families anticipate 
and groom their preferred candidates? (Prime Ministers will presumably be 
more active within their parties.) Or will the European Council, as an 
institution, try and pre-empt another parliamentary gambit? Will 
Spitzenkandidaten put forward slates or teams; a small cabinet of future 
Commissioners-in-waiting? Will they draft personal manifestos? Will the 
political groups in the Parliament try to force manifestos on their candidates? 
Will candidates seek to raise campaign funds, in the style of US Presidential 
candidates? Will candidates have higher profiles than was the case in 2014, for 
there will surely be higher levels of media interest and coverage? European 
political parties will surely become increasingly active and visible. And what 
will happen after the elections? Will the next Commission President continue 
with the current structures (there is no obligation under the Treaties)? Will the 
Member States nominate enough former heavy-hitters to enable him/her to 
continue with such a structure of Vice-Presidents and project teams? Will 
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some Member States nominate former heavy-hitters tactically with a view to 
winning strategically important Vice-Presidencies? 
 
A fascinating example of the sort of possibilities that might be opening up 
was provided by the current Secretary General of the European Parliament, 
Klaus Welle, at an academic conference considering the significance of the 
2014 European elections. Although a civil servant, Welle had previously acted 
as Secretary General of the EPP Group within the Parliament and had also 
previously been instrumental in enlarging the EPP family to sister political 
parties in the new Member States. Welle was rumoured to have played an 
important behind-the-scenes role in ensuring that the Parliament fulfilled its 
pre-ordained role in the Spitzenkandidaten process. (For example, ‘It was a 
Welle-fostered power play,’ reported the Financial Times on 14 May 2014, ‘that 
has yielded a new system of using the parliamentary elections to select the 
presidency of a more revered Brussels institution – the European 
Commission.’) In his analysis, Welle argued that the creation of an executive 
dependent on a parliamentary majority would lead also, inevitably, to the 
creation of an effective opposition within the system (as distinct from 
opposition to the system itself)11 and would necessarily have organisational 
and structural consequences for the other twin arm of the European Union’s 
legislative authority, the Council. 
 
On the other hand, Joseph Janning, of the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, wrote in July 2014 that: ‘One pattern has not been broken by the 
revolution: the temptation of European politics to oversell its latest outcome. 
In this spirit, the Spitzenkandidaten revolution will go into the history books as 
a leap towards a more democratic and accountable Europe. And this assertion                                                         11 The absence of such opposition within the system has been identified by Peter Mair as a fundamental weakness in the EU’s current democratic structure (Mair, 2007). 
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will remain as true as the contention that the Maastricht Treaty prepared the 
EU for major enlargement.’ This paper would argue that the election of Jean-
Claude Juncker and the appointment of the Juncker Commission wasn’t a 
leap; it was but another step, and it almost certainly won’t be the last. For, in 
closing, it should be noted that the EPP’s current political manifesto calls for 
the direct election of the Commission President. Thus, what the Lisbon Treaty 
got in the end may not have been what it wanted but, in the eyes of those who 
have been pushing forward the processes considered in this paper, it was 
certainly what it should have wanted. In any case, I hope that, through my 
analysis of the longer-term trends described in this paper, I have provided a 
chronicle of an election foretold.  
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